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Copyright, Derivative Works, and
the Economics of Complements
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
From an economic perspective, copyright is irrational. In
defining the scope of a copyright owner's exclusive rights, it treats
situations that have similar economic consequences differently, as
infringement in one case and not in the other, and situations that have
radically different economic consequences similarly. This essay
explores such area in which copyright exhibits economic irrationality:
Copyright's treatment of complements. Where a lower price on a
substitute reduces demand for the original, a lower price on a
complement increases it. So defined, copyright addresses whether a
copyright owner will control three different types of complements: (i)
complementary products, such as MP3 players and VCRs, that increase
the accessibility of copyright works; (ii) complementary uses of
copyrighted works, such as radio airplay; and (iii) complementary
reworkings of copyrighted works, such as movies based upon a novel.
Although the economic consequences associated with these
complements are identical, copyright treats these complements
differently. Some are infringing, at least, some of the time; others are
not. This essay explores this irrationality and proposes a unifying
principle: Where a given use, reuse, or product is a strong complement
to a copyrighted work, and would, in the absence of copyright's
intervention, be available in a naturally competitive market, the
copyright owner should not have the exclusive right to control such a
use, reuse, or product.
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In 1852, Harriet Beecher Stowe published her novel, Uncle
Tom's Cabin. With its anti-slavery message, the book became one of
the best-selling novels of the nineteenth century,1 threw fuel on the
debate between slave owners and those who opposed slavery, and may
have helped ignite the Civil War. Indeed, President Abraham Lincoln,
when he met Stowe at the start of the Civil War, is reputed to have
said, "So you're the little woman who wrote the book that made this
great war."
2
While President Lincoln was referring specifically to the Civil
War, Stowe's novel started a copyright war as well. Immediately
following the book's publication, a newspaper in Pennsylvania
serialized Stowe's novel, translating it into German for its readers.
Stowe sued, alleging copyright infringement. 3 The Circuit Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled against her, however,
holding that a translation is not a copy.4 At the time, the Copyright
Act gave a copyright owner the exclusive right to print, reprint, and
vend her book,5 but did not provide an exclusive right to translate or
adapt a book. As the court wrote, "A translation may, in loose
phraseology, be called a transcript or copy of her thoughts or
conceptions, but in no correct sense can it be called a copy of her
book."
6
In 1870, following the Civil War, Congress expressly provided
authors with an exclusive right to dramatize and translate their
1. Gail K. Smith, The Sentimental Novel: The Example of Harriet Beecher Stowe, in
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN WOMEN'S WRITING 221, 221
(Dale M. Bauer & Philip Gould eds., 2001).
2. CHARLEs EDWARD STOWE & LYMAN BEECHER STOWE, HARRIET BEECHER STOWE: THE
STORY OF HER LIFE 203 (1911).
3. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
4. Id. at 208.
5. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (repealed 1909) ("TIhe author or
authors of any book or books, map, chart, or musical composition .. .shall have the sole right
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending such book or books, map, chart,
musical composition, print, cut, or engraving, in whole or in part, for the term of twenty-eight
years....").
6. Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 208.
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copyrighted works as part of its second general revision 7 of the
Copyright Act.8 Having recognized the right, Congress carried it
forward in both the 1909 Act and the Copyright Act of 1976. In the
1909 Act, Congress tied the translation and adaptation right to the
specific nature of the work:
To translate the copyrighted work... if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a
nondramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama;
to arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a
model or design for a work of art.
9
In the current statute, the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress again
retained the dramatization and translation right, yet eschewed the
specific delineation of the 1909 Act. Instead, § 106(2) of the 1976
Copyright Act simply stated that a copyright owner has "the exclusive
right0 ... to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work."'10 It then defined a "derivative work" as "a work based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.""
The literal reach of the 1976 language is exceedingly broad. As
Justice Story noted long ago, "[e]very book in literature, science and
art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was
well known and used before." 12 Yet, despite its potential breadth, the
derivative work right has not proven to be material very often. Aside
from a handful of cases, the reproduction right has largely usurped
the role that the derivative work right was supposed to play. Thus,
when Judge Learned Hand famously elaborated the levels of
abstraction framework for analyzing infringement in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp.,13 the fact that the plaintiffs work was a play
while the defendant's work was a movie, or, in other words, a
7. Since enacting the initial copyright statute in 1790, Congress has enacted four
general revisions. The first in 1831; the second in 1870; the third in 1909; and the most recent in
1976. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976);
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1952); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, 4 Stat. 436
(repealed 1909).
8. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 ('That any citizen of the United
States ... who shall be the author ... of any book ... shall ... have the sole liberty of printing,
reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending the same;... and
authors may reserve the right to dramatize or to translate their own works.").
9. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of a "derivative work').
12. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
13. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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dramatization rather than a reproduction, of the plaintiffs play played
no explicit role in Judge Hand's analysis of the infringement issue. Or
more recently, Judge Patterson of the Southern District of New York
held that a lexicon created from the Harry Potter books was a copy,
and not a derivative work. 14 In his copyright treatise, Professor Mel
Nimmer takes the position that the derivative work right is
"completely superfluous."'15 According to Nimmer, either enough of the
plaintiffs original work is copied into the defendant's allegedly
infringing work to establish infringement of the reproduction or public
performance right, or it is not, and hence, no infringement, has
occurred. 16 In the first case, the derivative work right is redundant.
In the second, it is irrelevant.
Yet, from an economics perspective, treating the derivative
work right as either superfluous or irrelevant overlooks a potentially
critically distinction. Had the defendant in Nichols used the plaintiffs
play as the basis for a competing play set up in a theater next door,
the defendant's play would, whether technically an infringement or
not, undoubtedly have reduced demand for the plaintiffs play. In
economic terms, a play based upon another play would likely compete
with or substitute for the original work. Yet, the actual defendants in
Nichols used the copyrighted play to create a movie. In contrast to a
competing play, a movie based on the play, again regardless of
whether it is technically an infringement or not, is likely to increase,
rather than decrease, demand for the play.1 7 In economic terms, a
movie based upon Nichols' play is a complement, not a substitute.
This distinction is critical. The justification for allowing a
copyright owner to control the production of substitutes is reasonably
straightforward. Absent a legal right to do so, a would-be competitor
could simply copy another's work, thereby avoiding the authorship
costs entailed in creating the work, and offer competing copies of the
work for less. This competition would directly reduce the money that
the original author could expect to earn from sales of her own copies of
her work. In contrast, there is no similarly straightforward
justification for allowing a copyright owner to control the production of
14. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 538-39 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
15. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.09[A]
(LexisNexis 2009).
16. Id.
17. Whether a movie-version of a play serves as a complement or a substitute is
ultimately a factual question that would need to be resolved at trial. Certainly, the fact that
many plays remain popular even though movie versions of the same story are readily available
at a trivial price suggests that, for many consumers, movies are not a substitute for the
experience of seeing a play live.
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complements. By definition, the production of complements will not
reduce, as competing substitutes do, the profits or rents available to
the original author from sales of her own copies or of access to her
original work in its original form. Indeed, even in the absence of a
legal right to control them, the production of complements will
increase the rents the original author will earn.18
True, extending an author the right to control complementary
markets would increase the licensing fees that a copyright owner
could earn from her work. Yet, as the Court has stated time and
again, the point of copyright is not to enrich copyright owners.
Rather, it is "to promote the Progress of Science." 19 The key question
then is whether refusing to grant copyright owners the right to control
the production of complements would lead to an underproduction of
copyrighted works, or otherwise reduce social welfare. Certainly, as a
general rule in our economy, the creator of a given product does not
have the legal right, ipso facto, to control the production of associated
complements. The simple fact of creation does not provide an
automobile manufacturer the right to control the markets for
complements such as gasoline, tires, and after-market stereos. Nor
does it give a dress designer the right to control the markets for
complements such as shoes, purses, or other accessories. Although
both new car and new dress designs share a public good character
with original works of authorship, there are (apparently) sufficient
incentives for such new designs without any need for control over the
associated complements. Given this uniform practice, extending to a
copyright owner such control simply from the fact of creation is
difficult to justify.
This Article explores the complement-substitute dichotomy and
the role that it does and should play in setting sensible limits on
copyright's scope. Section I identifies three situations where copyright
and complements interact, and examines the legal rules courts and
Congress have developed for dealing with complements in copyright.
Section II then considers the economics of complements and
substitutes in order to develop the relevant considerations that should
help resolve the question of whether a copyright owner has, or should
have, the legal right to control complements. Given the principles
18. See infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
19. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.").
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articulated in Section II, Section III will then reexamine the cases
from Section I and try to suggest how the scope of copyright owner's
exclusive rights should be interpreted to promote social welfare when
dealing with complements. Finally, Section IV concludes, and
suggests in particular a need to leave more room in copyright for
complementary reworkings of original works.
I. COMPLEMENTS, COPYRIGHT, AND CONFUSION
At a general level, it is possible to identify three situations
where copyright has either extended or refused to extend a copyright
owner legal control over a complement. First, there are products or
services that are complementary to copyrighted works, such as the
VCR, the Betamax, and other devices that can record and replay
copyrighted works. Second, there are uses of a work that are
complementary. The classic example here is radio airplay. When a
song is played on the radio, its sales increase. Third, there are
reworkings of existing works that are complementary, such as a movie
based upon a novel. Again, as in the radio airplay example, it is well-
established that such a movie increases, rather than decreases,
demand for the novel. 20
At some level, the economic considerations that these three
cases raise are identical. Yet, copyright does not treat them
consistently. Some of these situations are permitted, while others are
prohibited. Moreover, copyright's rules do not seem to reflect any
coherent underlying principles. Even where two cases present
identical economic considerations in terms of the nature of the use, the
potential for a licensing market, and the economic impact on the
copyright owner, copyright law, as Congress wrote it or as courts have
interpreted it, will treat the cases differently.
Consider a few examples. First, from the complementary
hardware situation, imagine that a hotel installs VCRs in each of its
guest rooms and makes copyrighted movies available for rental.
Under existing law, the hotel makes some additional money from
renting the movies and the hotel guests get to watch the movies, yet
there is no copyright infringement. So long as the hotel has purchased
and is renting authorized copies of the movie, the hotel is insulated
20. See, e.g., Douglas YBarbo, Aesthetic Ambition Versus Commercial Appeal: Adapting
Novels to Film and the Copyright Law, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 299, 372 (1998) ("It seems that the
force of exposure to movies is so overwhelming that even bad movies will dramatically increase
the sales of books." (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
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from copyright infringement by copyright's first sale doctrine. 21
Imagine a slightly different scenario, however, where the same hotel
decides, instead of VCRs in each room, to set up a central computer
which stores copyrighted movies and then streams them into the hotel
rooms on a guest's request. Economically, the consequences are the
same as having VCRs and videotapes available for rental; the hotel
makes money from charging for access to the movies, and the guests
get to watch the movies. Yet, under copyright law, such a use
constitutes copyright infringement. The hotel is publicly performing
the copyrighted works at issue and is not insulated from liability by
the first-sale doctrine. The hotel must therefore obtain a license in
order to make movies available to its guests in this fashion.
22
When the analysis moves from complementary hardware to the
second category of complementary uses, there are a number of
examples of similar inconsistency. For example, performing a musical
work in a place open to the public is generally a public performance
requiring permission from the copyright owner, but not always. If the
otherwise public performance is made using only a home-style
receiving apparatus, or occurs in a restaurant or bar under a certain
size, then the use falls outside the copyright owner's control and no
license is required.
23
Similarly, when Congress finally added a parallel public
performance right for sound recordings in 1995,24 Congress did not
extend the right to historically paradigmatic types of public
performances. For example, the sound recording copyright owner does
21. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278
(9th Cir. 1989).
22. See On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D.
Cal. 1991). Perhaps, the fact that the hotel with the VCRs has to buy multiple copies of each
tape, in order to ensure a sufficient supply for its guests, where the hotel with the central
computer only needs one copy, creates a sufficient distinction to justify requiring a licensing fee
in central computer case. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 634-46 (1996) [hereinafter Lunney, Paradigm]. However, it
seems unlikely to me that, in this context, the reuse of a single copy through a computer to
satisfy multiple hotel guests simultaneously would, in the absence of a separate licensing fee,
lead to the underproduction of movies. Id. at 641-45 (suggesting that derivative use should
require a license in this context only if three conditions are satisfied: (i) does the hotel with the
computer have a much higher reservation price for a single copy of the movie because it can show
that same copy to multiple guests simultaneously; (ii) is that difference in reservation value
unique to the movie or would the hotel have the same increased reservation value for nonwork
products, such as the computer itself; and (iii) is the hotel market sufficiently competitive that
the hotel with the single computer would not be able to charge a significantly higher price for its
hotel rooms in any event).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006).
24. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
2010]
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 12:4:779
not have the right to control a non-subscription broadcast
transmissions of her work; the retransmission of such a broadcast,
through, for example, a cable provider; or the performance of her work
within a business establishment. 25 Rather, the right applies only to
(1) a limited category of non-subscription and subscription
transmissions, such as certain webcasters; and (2) interactive
transmissions which enable a member of the public to receive, on
request, a transmission of a particular sound recording or a program
specially created for the recipient. With respect to the first category,
Congress narrowed the digital public performance right for sound
recordings further by providing a compulsory license.26 Although
politics-and the opposition of musical work copyright owners-
undoubtedly played a role in shaping and narrowing the scope of the
sound recording public performance right, political expediency alone
cannot fully explain the somewhat curious final form of the public
performance rights for sound recordings.
Or, consider the use of a copyrighted work to advertise the
copyrighted work itself. In DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., the
plaintiff sued the owner of a chain of retail bookstores, all of which
operated under the name "the Batcave," 27 for, inter alia, copyright
infringement when the defendant distributed fliers for the bookstores
that used drawings of the plaintiffs copyrighted Green Arrow and
Batman characters. On the copyright claims, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding the use
to be fair. With respect to the fourth fair use factor, which measures
the effect that a use has on the market for the original work, the
district court stated that "it does not appear that plaintiff was harmed
by defendants' use of the figures. On the contrary, defendants' use of
the figures advertised their sale of plaintiffs comic books, leading to
an increased market for plaintiffs goods." 28  On appeal, the Second
Circuit reversed and found infringement. The court held that because
the advertisement copied the visual appearance of the characters-the
expression of the work-the use was infringing. For the Second
Circuit, the fact that the very point of the copying was to advertise the
comic books for sale was immaterial. 29
25. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A)-(C) (2006).
26. Id. § 114(d)(2), (1); see also Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485 (3d Cir.
2003) (affirming the Copyright Office's decision to require a compulsory license for simultaneous
transmission of a radio station's broadcast through the Internet).
27. 696 F.2d 24, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1982).
28. D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), reu'd,
696 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982).
29. D.C. Comics, 696 F.2d at 28.
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Yet, in § 110(7) of the Copyright Act, Congress has expressly
allowed such advertising uses for the public performance of musical
works at record stores. 30 Again, the economic consequences of these
two advertising uses are the same. However, as a result of the Second
Circuit's decision, copyright law nonetheless treats them differently.
With respect to the third category of complementary uses,
where a later author has reworked an earlier, copyrighted work, two
distinct issues can arise. The first issue asks whether a reworking
constitutes an infringement-the same question focused on with
respect to the first two categories of complementary uses. The second
issue is new, however, and focuses on whether the reworking is
entitled to its own copyright. On both, the current copyright law has
produced muddled answers.
With respect to whether a reworking constitutes an infringing
and unfair use, consider the differing outcomes in two cases involving
add-ons for video games. In Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of
America, Inc., Galoob offered a device, called the Game Genie, that,
when used in conjunction with Nintendo's gaming system, allowed the
user to vary aspects of the system's game-play. 31 With the device, a
player's character could have more lives, could move faster, or could
float over obstacles. 32 The device was not a substitute for the original
Nintendo gaming system, or the associated software-the game
cartridges. Indeed, the device could not be used at all unless the
consumer already had both the gaming system and the games.
Nevertheless, Nintendo sued, alleging copyright infringement. The
Ninth Circuit rejected the claim, and, while acknowledging that use of
the Game Genie altered the video game display, held that the altered
game-play did not constitute an infringing derivative work. 33 The
court also held that, even if the altered game-play was a derivative
work, a consumer's use of the Game Genie was a fair and hence non-
infringing use of Nintendo's underlying works.
34
Only six years later, however, the court reached a different
conclusion in Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc. 35 When Formgen created
and sold the Duke Nukem video game, it included, as an aspect of the
game, a program that allowed users to create their own levels for the
game's hero, Duke Nukem, to traverse and defeat. Over time, users
30. 17 U.S.C. § 110(7) (2006).
31. 964 F.2d 9654 (9th Cir. 1992).
32. Id. at 967.
33. Id. at 969.
34. Id. at 970-72.
35. 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
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developed a large number of such levels, stored as individual MAP
files. Micro Star collected some of the most popular, or best, user-
created levels and distributed them on a disc. As in the case of the
Game Genie, a consumer already had to have a copy of the Duke
Nukem games in order to use these MAP files. Like the Game Genie,
the availability of these additional MAP files was a complement,
increasing the value of owning a copy of the original. Yet, the court
expressly refused to follow Lewis Galoob Toys, and held that Micro
Star's actions both created infringing derivative works and was not a
fair use.
36
Similar inconsistencies arise when the issue is whether a
reworking is entitled to its own copyright. Doctrinally, a reworking is
entitled to its own copyright so long as it satisfies the originality
standard for a derivative work. Courts generally phrase the standard
similarly, asking whether the derivative work entails "a
distinguishable," or "some substantial, not merely trivial" variation. 37
They also emphasize a common policy concern behind the standard,
focusing on whether the derivative work is different enough to make
plain in the event of a subsequent similar work from a third party
whether the third party copied from the original or from the derivative
work. 38 Nevertheless, despite these common starting points, courts
sometimes find a derivative work to be original even though it entails
very little variation, while in other cases they find a derivative work to
be unoriginal even though it entails considerable variation.
Compare, for example, the differing outcomes in Eden Toys,
Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co. 39 and Gracen v. Bradford
Exchange.40 In Eden Toys, the plaintiff had created a derivative image
of the Paddington Bear and alleged that the defendant had copied it
for a series of adult sleep-shirts. 41 The key question was whether the
plaintiffs version of the Paddington Bear contained sufficient
variation to qualify as original and have a valid copyright in its own
right. As the court explained, there were some differences between
the plaintiffs and the original bear:
In this case, the Eden/Gibson variations of the Ivor Wood sketch, although too minor to
entitle the Eden/Gibson work to claim a different aesthetic appeal, are still original and
substantial enough to deserve independent copyright protection. The numerous changes
36. Id. at 1112-13.
37. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
38. See, e.g., id. at 491-92; see also Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304-05 (7th
Cir. 1983).
39. 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982).
40. 698 F.2d 300.
41. 697 F.2d at 29-31.
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made by Gibson-the changed proportions of the hat, the elimination of individualized
fingers and toes, the overall smoothing of lines-combine to give the Eden/Gibson
drawing a different, cleaner "look" than the Ivor Wood sketch on which it is based.
4 2
Based on these differences, the court held that the later drawing was
original and therefore entitled to its own copyright.
In Gracen, on the other hand, the Seventh Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion, despite acknowledging similar differences in the
derivative work. 43 In this case, the plaintiff, Gracen, had created a
drawing of the character Dorothy from the Wizard of Oz, which she
alleged that Bradford Exchange had copied for a set of commemorative
plates based upon the movie. As the court noted, a comparison of
Dorothy as she appeared in the individual movie frames and Gracen's
drawing "reveal[ed] perceptible differences" in the character.44
Moreover, to create her drawing, Gracen did not simply take a single
movie frame and copy it as closely as possible. Rather, she took the
image of Dorothy from one frame and placed it in a background taken
from another frame. 45 Presumably, this difference was sufficient to
enable a trier of fact to discern whether the defendant had created its
version of Dorothy by copying from the movie or by copying from
Gracen. Precisely at this critical juncture, however, where the policy
that the court articulated for the derivative originality requirement
had to be applied to determine whether the differences at issue were
sufficient to qualify as original, the court abandoned the policy and
simply asserted, "We do not consider a picture created by
superimposing one copyrighted photographic image on another to be
'original."' 46
Yet, why shouldn't Gracen's selection of that particular
combination of image and background be sufficient to sustain her
copyright? Out of all the possible combinations that could arise from
selecting an image of Dorothy from one movie frame and a background
from another, the chance that a defendant would happen to select the
same combination as Gracen due to coincidence, rather than copying,
is exceedingly slim. If the purpose of the derivative originality
42. Id. at 34.
43. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304-05. And this despite a warning from Gracen's counsel
"that judges can make fools of themselves pronouncing on aesthetic matters." Id. at 304. In a
subsequent case, Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh
Circuit rejected the view that Gracen imposed a heightened originality requirement in the
derivative work context. Id. at 521. All that is required is that "there is sufficient nontrivial
expressive variation in the derivative work to make it distinguishable from the underlying work
in some meaningful way." Id.
44. Id. at 304-05.
45. Id. at 305.
46. Id.
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standard is to enable the trier of fact to be sure that the defendant
copied from Gracen's version, rather than original, it would seem that
the purpose is satisfied here. After all, Gracen created six drawings of
characters, including Dorothy, based upon the Wizard of Oz. 47 The
defendants produced their plates of all but Dorothy to demonstrate
that they had not copied the other characters. 48 The defendants
refused, however, to produce a copy of their Dorothy plate, "lending
some support to the charge that it is a 'piratical copy."'
49
Copyright's treatment of complements is thus rather confusing.
Sometimes a complementary use or reworking will constitute
infringement; sometimes it will not. With the hope of establishing
principles that can guide copyright's resolution of these issues, the
Article turns now to the economics of complements.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF COMPLEMENTS
This Section begin with a simple question: Why should a
copyright owner ever have the power to control the production of
complements? In general, in the economy, the notion that the mere
fact of creating a product ipso facto grants the creator a right to
control complementary markets is rejected. Society does not accord
the carmaker the right to control the sale of tires, or the dress
designer the sale of shoes. Why then should it give the copyright
owner such a right?
Some might argue that allowing a copyright owner to control
the production of complements would create potential licensing
opportunities for the copyright owner and may increase the copyright
owner's revenue associated with any given work. The goal of
copyright is not, however, to maximize the revenue of copyright
owners.50  The goal of copyright is not even to maximize the
47. Id. at 301-02.
48. Id. at 302.
49. Id.
50. As the Court explained in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly ... reflects a balance of
competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's" creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (citations omitted); see also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527
(1994) ("[Clopyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through
access to creative works ...."); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991) ("The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote
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production of original works. Rather, copyright's goal is to provide
protection sufficient to ensure the socially optimal production of works
of authorship, that is, to encourage the production of additional works
of authorship so long as that represents the highest and best use of
society's available resources. As a result, it is difficult to justify a
legal right to control complements simply by showing that a copyright
owner's revenue would be lower absent such a right; nor can such a
right be justified by showing that fewer original works would be
produced absent such a right. Rather, what needs to be shown is that,
absent such a right, copyright owners would earn so little on their
work that too few original works would exist, relative to the
conjectured social optimum.
Of course, determining copyright's optimal scope, in this sense,
presents a difficult-some would say impossible-empirical inquiry.
While the author has tried to suggest in a previous article the sort of
analysis that would be required to define copyright's optimal scope,
51
courts and commentators often seem to use maximizing copyright
owner's revenue or the production of copyrighted works as a proxy for
copyright's true purpose. Accepting, for the moment, that maximizing
a copyright owner's revenue is a useful proxy for copyright's actual
purpose, the question is whether a formal legal right to control a
complementary use is necessary to maximize a copyright owner's
revenue. The somewhat surprising answer is: not necessarily.
Consider a simple, but traditional, example.52 Assume that
there is only one entity, United Shoe, which manufactures and
distributes shoes in the economy. In the ordinary, legal, and economic
sense, United Shoe has a monopoly over the production of shoes, and
as a rational, profit-maximizing entity, the company will set the price
for its shoes to maximize its profits. As it turns out, the maximizing
price for United Shoe is $50 per pair of shoes. Given a marginal cost
of $5 per shoe, or $10 per pair, this means that United Shoe earns a
monopoly profit of $40 on each pair of shoes it sells.
Assume that the law or technology changes so that United
Shoe retains its monopoly over the production of right shoes, but that
the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); Fox Film Corp.
v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ('"The sole interest of the United States and the primary object
in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors.").
51. See Lunney, Paradigm, supra note 22.
52. Although he is no longer with us, I remain indebted to Bill Baxter for this example.
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Comment, Atari v. Nintendo: Does a Closed System Violate the
Antitrust Laws?, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 29, 34 (1990) [hereinafter Lunney, Antitrust]; see also WARD
S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 70-76 (1973);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 173 (1976).
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anyone can and may now produce left shoes. The market for left shoes
quickly becomes competitive and economic theory predicts that prices
for left shoes will fall to their marginal cost, or $5 per shoe. United
Shoe, however, can still earn the same monopoly profit. Even though
it retains its monopoly solely with respect to right shoes, and has lost
its right or ability to control production in the complementary market
for left shoes, it will simply price the matching right shoes at $45 per
shoe. Subtracting its marginal cost of $5 per right shoe, this will leave
United Shoe with the same $40 per pair monopoly profit that it had
when it had a monopoly over both shoes.
Despite the silliness-and perhaps absurdity-of this
hypothetical, it nonetheless offers important economic lessons
regarding complements. Most importantly, it demonstrates that, even
in the absence of any legal or practical right to control the market for
the complementary left shoe, United Shoe can earn the same profit
simply by controlling the market for right shoes. Thus, even if
copyright's purpose was to maximize copyright owner's revenue,
recognizing a copyright owner's legal right to control complementary
uses may be unnecessary.
As it turns out, whether it is possible to generalize this shoe
example to cases involving copyrighted works turns on two
assumptions in the shoe hypothetical. First, in the shoe example, the
left shoe and the right shoe are fixed-ratio complements, where
consumption of the complement is matched one-for-one to
consumption of the original. Sales of additional left shoes thus
increase sales of the original right shoe on a one-for-one basis. As a
result, United Shoe's revenue is the same whether or not United Shoe
has the formal legal right to control the sale of left shoes. It is not
however necessary for complements to have a one-for-one or other
fixed-ratio consumption pattern for this result to hold. Consider the
video game industry. Manufacturers of the videogame consoles, such
as the Xbox, routinely sell their consoles below cost, and earn all of
their profit by charging a price, significantly above marginal cost, for
the video games themselves. 53 Having market power over both
markets, these companies maximize their revenue by foregoing any
monopoly mark-up on the hardware and instead recover all of their
rents on sales of the video games. In this market, there is no fixed
ratio for consumption of hardware and software. Some consumers
purchase a large number of games; others just a few. Indeed, it is this
very feature that allows Microsoft and other manufacturers of video
53. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry,
83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 969 (2005); see generally Lunney, Antitrust, supra note 52.
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game platforms to use game sales as a type of price discrimination
scheme separating high reservation value consumers who typically
purchase more games from low reservation value consumers who
typically purchase fewer.
54
Nevertheless, while fixed ratio complements are not necessary,
the extent to which the two products are complements is one factor
that tends to determine the extent to which market power over one
will enable a company to recover the same profit as market power over
both. The more strongly two products complement each other, the less
need to control both markets in order to maximize revenue. Applying
this analysis to copyright law suggests that when a derivative use of a
copyrighted work has a strong complementary effect, there is less need
to recognize a copyright owner's right to control the derivative use.
Even in the absence of such a separate right, the copyright owner can
recover, at least, some of the profit they could otherwise earn in the
derivative market or for a license simply by charging a higher price
for, or selling additional copies of, her original work.
Not all derivative works, however, will have such strong
complementary effects. Some derivative uses may have only weak
complementary effects, increasing demand for the original only
slightly. Some derivative uses may not increase the demand for the
original at all. In such cases, a separate legal right to control the
derivative use may increase the copyright owner's profits associated
with her work.
For example, recall the facts from Stowe.55 If some individuals
in any given group of consumers strongly prefer to read Uncle Tom's
Cabin in English and others prefer to read it in German, Thomas's
serialization of Uncle Tom's Cabin in German will not likely reduce
demand for Stowe's original English-language version. Thus,
Thomas's version is not a substitute for the original. At the same
time, however, the availability of Thomas's version may not increase
demand for Stowe's original, either. There may be some limited
network effect, as a broader readership will lead to more people with
whom to discuss and thereby enjoy the work. However, if consumers
are split into primarily English- and primarily German-speaking
camps, it is not clear that a broader German-speaking readership will
create this sort of network effect for the English-speakers. Thus,
Thomas's version is not much of a complement either. Except for
those consumers equally comfortable with either version, the German
and English versions of Uncle Tom's Cabin occupy separate and
54. See Lunney, Antitrust, supra note 52.
55. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
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unrelated markets. Because the German language version is not a
strong complement, Stowe would not be able to earn additional profits
from the distribution of Thomas's German version simply by
increasing the price for, or selling more of, her English-language
copies.
In terms of maximizing the copyright owner's incentives, the
first issue is thus the extent to which the use at issue is a complement.
Where the derivative use at issue is not a strong complement, giving
the copyright owner a legal right to control that use would likely
increase the copyright owner's profits. If, on the other hand, the use
at issue is a strong complement, then a legal right to control the use
may or may not increase her revenue. Instead, it will depend on
whether a second assumption found in the shoe hypothetical is
satisfied, specifically whether the market for the complementary good
is competitive.
In our United Shoe example, United Shoe earned the same
profit when it controlled the sale of right shoes as it did when it
controlled the sale of both shoes, given that the market for left shoes
was competitive. This is the second key assumption. If this
assumption changes, and instead another company, General Shoe,
was given a monopoly on the production of left shoes, United Shoe
would no longer earn the same profit. At best, it would agree to
somehow split the available monopoly profit with General Shoe. At
worst, both United Shoe and General Shoe would attempt to charge
their own optimal monopolistic price, given their expectation as to how
the other would price their shoe. In such a case, consumers would end
up with a double monopoly mark-up, with a total price for a pair of
shoes well in excess of $50. Such a double monopoly mark-up would
not only increase the deadweight loss and otherwise substantially
reduce consumer welfare, but also decrease the profits earned by the
two companies.5 6
Thus, in extending the shoe hypothetical to copyright, one must
also consider whether the market for the derivative use will, in the
absence of copyright's intervention, be naturally competitive or
monopolistic. In copyright, some of the derivative uses might well be
natural monopolies. For example, radio broadcast stations could be
56. For a discussion of the double monopoly mark-up problem generally, see BOWMAN,
supra note 52, at 72. For an article extending the argument, somewhat implausibly in my view,
to the video game context, see Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform
Technologies, 29 J. Legal Stud. 615 (2000). The reason the extension strikes me as implausible is
that we are likely to have competition and not monopoly if anyone can and may manufacture
software compatible with any given video game platform. See Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law
and Price Discrimination, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 55, 126 n. 293 (2001).
THE ECONOMICS OF COMPLEMENTS
classified as natural monopolies, because (1) they are characterized by
high fixed and low marginal costs to operate, (2) there is limited
spectrum available for their broadcasts, and (3) a network effect may
arise to the extent that a listener's enjoyment of any given broadcast
increases with that broadcast's total number of listeners.5 7 Likewise,
a plausible argument could be made that movie versions of a novel
have a natural monopoly character for similar reasons.
58
As the United Shoe example suggests, where the derivative use
at issue is complementary but has such a natural monopoly character,
the copyright owner will not earn as much from the derivative use
absent a legal right to control the use. If the goal is to maximize the
copyright owner's revenue, either directly or as a proxy for copyright's
true purpose, recognizing a separate legal right to control the use
would make sense in such a case.
This analysis thus suggests two paradigm cases. In the first,
the derivative use at issue is strongly complementary and the
associated market for the derivative use is otherwise competitive.
Here, even if the goal is to maximize the copyright owner's revenue, a
separate legal right to control the derivative use is probably
unnecessary. In such a case, the copyright owner can earn the same
revenue as she could with formal legal control over the derivative use
simply by charging more for, or selling more copies of, her original
work in its original form. In the second, the derivative use at issue is
either not complementary or the associated market is naturally
monopolistic. In this case, a separate legal right to control such
derivative uses will likely increase the copyright owner's revenue.
In the real world, many derivative uses will fall somewhere in
between these two paradigm cases. A derivative use may be
somewhat complementary and its associated market may entail some
degree of market power. Nevertheless, to the extent that the
derivative use at issue falls closer to one end or the other, a closer
analysis will reveal the extent to which recognizing a formal legal
57. The Court used the limited spectrum available for radio broadcasting as a
justification for upholding the Federal Communications Commission's regulation of radio
broadcasting against a First Amendment challenge. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 400-01 (1969).
In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's role in allocating
those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable without governmental
assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold the
regulations and ruling at issue here are both authorized by statute and constitutional.
Id. (citation omitted).
58. Admittedly, the making of multiple movies contemporaneous with, or based upon,
some actual event, such as the Long Island Lolita case or the gunfight at the O.K. Corral,
undercuts this argument.
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right to control that derivative use will increase the copyright owner's
revenue, holding all else constant.5 9 As the derivative use becomes
less complementary and more naturally monopolistic, a separate legal
right to control the use becomes more likely to increase the copyright
owner's revenue. As the derivative use becomes more complementary
and more naturally competitive, a separate legal right to control the
use becomes less likely to increase the copyright owner's revenue.
Courts addressing these issues, however, have generally
rejected any attempt to draw such distinctions. Some courts have
suggested that the distinction between complements and substitutes
is simply irrelevant. 60 For these courts, the key question is whether a
defendant has copied protected expression from a copyrighted work.6 1
Whether the defendant used the copied expression to create a
substitute or a complement is immaterial.
Judge Hand's analysis in Nichols implicitly adopts such an
approach. Because he adopted the position implicitly, Judge Hand
made no attempt to justify it, but other courts have sought to justify
such an approach expressly. For example, in Rogers v. Koons, the
plaintiff held the copyright in a black-and-white photograph of "a
smiling husband and wife holding a litter of charming puppies."62
When the defendant created a three-dimensional sculpture of the
image, the plaintiff sued for copyright infringement. In asserting that
his use was fair, the defendant argued, effectively, that the statue was
a complement, not a substitute. However, the Second Circuit rejected
the proposed distinction. Although the fourth fair use factor expressly
directs a court to consider the effect of the defendant's use on the
59. In addition to the questions of whether the use is complementary and naturally
competitive, the value of a separate right to control the derivative use will depend upon the size
and value of the derivative use market.
60. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307-08 (2d Cir. 1992); D.C. Comics Inc. v.
Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982). But see Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d
512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002).
Generalizing from this example in economic terminology that has become orthodox in
fair-use case law, we may say that copying that is complementary to the copyrighted
work (in the sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying
that is a substitute for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes
for pegs or screws), or for derivative works from the copyrighted work is not fair use.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
61. See, e.g., Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting
fair use defense because "Micro Star's use of FormGen's protected expression was made purely
for financial gain")
62. 960 F.2d 301, 303. For other cases finding Koons' work to be copyright infringement,
see United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 375-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Campbell
v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055 (RO), 1993 WL 97381, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3957 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1,
1993). For a more recent decision finding his "appropriation" or "neo-Pop" art to be a fair use, see
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
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value of the copyrighted work, the court held that the fact that the
defendant's use increases demand for the copyrighted work was not
material.63 To support this conclusion, the Second Circuit pointed out
that a movie can infringe a novel even though movies typically
increase demand for their associated novels.
64
Given the express language of the fourth fair use factor, this
reasoning is decidedly curious. Section 107 of the Copyright Act
expressly directs a court to consider "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."65  This
language seems to suggest directly that the question of whether the
use at issue is a substitute, which reduces the market for and the
value of the copyrighted work, or a complement, which increases the
market, is relevant to the fair use determination. The Second
Circuit's reasoning does not account for this distinction at all. Yet, the
Second Circuit cannot take the credit (or blame) for ignoring the
distinction, as the court took the novel-movie example, and its
associated reasoning, from one of the leading copyright treatises,
Professor Nimmer's. As Professor Nimmer himself explained:
In determining the effect of the defendant's use upon the potential market for or value of
the plaintiffs work, a comparison must be made not merely of the media in which the
two works may appear, but rather in terms of the function of each such work regardless
of media. The irrelevance of media in making this determination is apparent in the
following example. Suppose A is the copyright owner of a published novel. B produces a
motion picture copied from and substantially similar to A's novel. The motion picture
may well not adversely affect the sale of A's novel. In fact, it almost certainly will have
the opposite effect. It is nevertheless clear that B may not invoke the defense of fair use.
B's motion picture has not prejudiced the sale of A's work in the book medium, but it has
certainly prejudiced the sale of A's work in the motion picture medium. If the
defendant's work adversely affects the value of any of the rights in the copyrighted work
(in this case the adaptation right), the use is not fair, even if the rights thus affected
have not as yet been exercised by the plaintiff.
6 6
Yet, for the purposes of this analysis, Professor Nimmer's
analysis is entirely inadequate. First, it is necessary to understand
why a copyright owner should have the right to control the production
of complements at all, and, in that regard, Professor Nimmer's tale
provides no help. Professor Nimmer simply posits that once Congress
has expressly recognized a copyright owner's control over a specific
63. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 311-12.
64. Id. at 312.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
66. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[B][1]
(LexisNexis 2009) (citations omitted). However, later in the same section, Nimmer takes a
somewhat inconsistent position. Id. ("[I]f . . . the defendant's work, although containing
substantially similar material, performs a different function than that of the plaintiffs, the
defense of fair use may be invoked." (citing Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252 n.4)).
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complement, such as making a film from a novel, the fact that it is a
complement rather than a substitute is no longer material. That's fine
as far as it goes, but his analysis explains nothing about whether or
why Congress should grant copyright owners such control in the first
place. Second, and more importantly, extending Nimmer's analysis to
the facts in Rogers v. Koons represents a classic non sequitur. The
fact that Congress has recognized a copyright owner's control over
some complements does not mean that the Congress has recognized
such control over all complements or has forbidden courts from
considering the complement-substitute distinction as part of a fair use
analysis in specific cases. After all, even if one can plausibly assert
that Congress has expressly spoken on whether copyright owners have
the right to control the making of a movie from their copyrighted
novel, the notion that Congress has been similarly clear on whether a
sculptor can use a photograph as inspiration is mere fancy.67
Still, even courts that recognize that the substitute-
complement distinction is important have trouble reconciling
incorporating such a distinction with the broad literal reach of the
derivative work right. For example, in Ty, Inc. v. Publications
International, Inc., Judge Posner tried to write the substitute-
complement distinction into copyright law:
[C]opying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are
complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a substitute for the
copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs or screws), or for
derivative works from the copyrighted work, is not fair use.
6 8
Although he found defendant's particular use-using photographs of
the plaintiffs copyrighted Beanie Babies to create a collector's guide-
to be fair and non-infringing, his opinion recognized the tension
between finding a complementary reworking fair because it increases,
rather than decreases, the value of the plaintiffs copyrighted works,
and the broad definition Congress gave derivative works in § 101 of
the 1976 Copyright Act. 69
In the end, however, the Copyright Act's express statutory
language does not foreclose consideration of the complement-
substitute distinction in resolving infringement issues. True,
67. For a similar non sequitur, Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th
Cir. 1998) ("A copyright owner holds the right to create sequels, and the stories told in the NI
MAP files are surely sequels, telling new (though somewhat repetitive) tales of Duke's fabulous
adventures." (internal citation omitted)).
68. 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).
69. Id. at 518, 520-22 ("were control of derivative works not part of a copyright owner's
bundle of rights, it would be clear that [defendant's] books fell on the complement side of the
divide and so were sheltered by the fair-use defense.").
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Congress expressly included in the 1976 Copyright Act a broad
definition of derivative works and has long defined some complements,
such as a film version of a novel, as infringing. Yet, it is equally true
that Congress has specifically directed courts to consider, as part of
the fair use analysis, the effect of the use at issue on the value of the
copyrighted work. Where a use is complementary and hence increases
the value of the copyrighted work, this would seem to weigh in favor of
fair use. It is not possible to resolve the inevitable tension between
these two provisions by enforcing one provision and ignoring the other,
as if Congress really meant only some of the statutory language. 70
Rather, as a matter of statutory construction, it would seem that there
must be room for both, distinguishing somehow those complementary
uses that are fair from those that are infringing.
If the goal, however, is to maximize a copyright owner's
revenue, then an alternative argument for ignoring the complement-
substitution distinction is simply to leave the decision whether to
license a particular derivative use to the copyright owner. If there is
money to be made from licensing a given derivative use, the copyright
owner will presumably recognize that fact and license the use. If the
derivative use is likely to prove complementary and increases sales of
the owner's original, the copyright owner will presumably recognize
that as well and will adjust the licensing fee accordingly. Therefore,
the copyright owner should have a broad right to control derivative
uses irrespective of the substitute-complement distinction, or so the
argument would go.
Or, one could simply argue that copyright is property. As
property, shouldn't the copyright owner have the same rights and
power to control use of her property as the owner of other forms of
personal or real property?
Courts have made both of these arguments as well. For
example, in the DC Comics case, discussed above,71 the Second Circuit
offered the following explanation for finding the advertising use to be
an infringement:
70. As the Court has stated:
We are not at liberty to construe any statute so as to deny effect to any part of its
language. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect
shall, if possible, be accorded to every word. As early as in Bacon's Abridgment, sect.
2, it was said that "a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can
be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant."
This rule has been repeated innumerable times.
Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1879); see also United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc.,
503 U.S. 30, 35-37 (1992); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 486
(1985).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
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Since one of the benefits of ownership of copyrighted material is the right to license its
use for a fee, even a speculated increase in DC's comic book sales as a consequence of
RFI's infringement would not call the fair use defense into play as a matter of law. The
owner of the copyright is in the best position to balance the prospect of increased sales
against revenue from a license.
7 2
The first sentence is an entirely unpersuasive variation on the
Nimmer argument. The question before the court is whether "one of
the benefits of [copyright] ownership" is to control the use at issue.
Surely answering that question requires more than merely assuming
the desired answer in a subordinate clause. The court then uses a
circular argument to rebut the inference of fair use that would seem to
flow directly from the fourth fair use factor. The circular argument
goes like this: even if the use increases the potential market for and
value of the copyrighted work (by advertising and hence increasing
their associated sales), the use is nonetheless unfair because if it is
unfair, then the copyright owner may charge a licensing fee for the
use, the revenue of which he would lose if the use were fair.
Putting to one side these plainly inadequate arguments, the
second sentence presents a more substantive argument for finding
infringement. It suggests that even if the use at issue increases the
copyright owner's revenue, it is still best to recognize a legal right to
control the use, as the copyright owner will recognize that fact and
allow the use to continue. It also implicitly argues that for
copyrighted works, just as for private goods more generally, someone
must balance the costs and benefits of various uses and determine
which uses are to be made. The copyright owner, the court argues, is
in "the best position" to perform that balancing, and hence should
have the right to control the use.
However, both of these arguments are fundamentally flawed.
The first argument, that the copyright owner is best positioned to
make the decision that will maximize her revenues, has two flaws.
First, maximizing incentives for copyright owners is, in fact, not the
goal of copyright; it is at best just a proxy for copyright's real
purpose.7 3 Given that the fact of creation does not ipso facto create a
corresponding legal right to control associated derivative markets
generally in the economy,74 there is no prima facie reason to believe
72. DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982).
73. See supra note 51.
74. As one court explained:
While courts have recognized that one has a right to one's own harvest, this
proposition has not been construed to preclude others from profiting from demands for
collateral services generated by the success of one's business venture. General Motors'
cars, for example, enjoy significant popularity and seat cover manufacturers profit
from that popularity by making covers to fit General Motors' seats. The same
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that there will be too few copyrighted works, relative to the social
optimum, in the absence of the additional incentives that such a right
might provide to copyright owners. To the contrary, by giving
copyright owners rights of control beyond those accorded the creators
of other types of creative products, there is every reason to believe
that the associated additional incentives are likely to lead to an
overproduction of original works, rather than avoid an
underproduction.7 5
Second, broader control over derivative and complementary
uses may mean more money, and hence incentives for the original
copyright owner, but such control means correspondingly less for the
creator of the derivative work or complementary product. 76 It took
effort to create the Harry Potter lexicon, and that type of effort
requires an incentive of its own to ensure that such derivative works
are created. So, the question becomes: which type of work should
copyright encourage at the margin? Does society want more of the
original works or does it want more of these complementary products?
Granting the original author broader control over derivative uses and
complementary products answers that question in favor of more
original works, but it is not clear that that answer in every case better
advances social welfare or "the progress of Science."
The problem with the property analogy is that most of the
property dealt with in everyday life is so-called "private goods," or
goods that are subject to rivalrous consumption. In a situation of
rivalrous consumption, one use physically precludes other uses. For
example, if I eat an apple, it's gone, and you cannot eat it as well. In
contrast, works of authorship are not generally subject to rivalrous
consumption, and are thus public, and not private, goods. I can watch
a television program or movie, or read a book, at the same time you
do. I can take clips from a movie or song, and create a mash-up, and
relationship exists between hot dog producers and the bakers of hot dog rolls. But in
neither instance, I believe, could it be successfully contended that an actionable
misappropriation occurs.
National Football League v. Governor of Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977).
75. As explained elsewhere in detail, to the extent that the legal rights that copyright
provides enables a copyright owner to capture a larger share of the surplus associated with a
creative investment than an individual can recover by investing her creativity in some endeavor
not protected by copyright, copyright will lead to too much creative investment in producing
original works of authorship and too little creativity invested elsewhere in the economy. See
Lunney, Antitrust, supra note 52. For a parallel argument with respect to copyright-enabled
price discrimination, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright's Price Discrimination Panacea, 21
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 387, 394-445 (2008).
76. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
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you can do the same. In the case of public goods, my use does not
physically preclude your use.
With respect to private goods, having a designated owner to
decide between the available uses makes sense. If only one use or
another can be made of a good, someone has to choose which use will
be made, and we might as well call the person who makes that choice
the good's owner. More generally, for private goods, designating an
owner tends to (1) ensure that the good is put to its highest value use,
(2) minimize externalities, and (3) reduce transaction costs associated
with using the good.
77
However, for a public good such as a copyrighted work, these
same considerations all point in the opposite direction. They all cut
against designating an owner for public goods. Once a public good is
created, recognizing private ownership makes it less likely that the
good will be put to all of its highest-value uses, while at the same time
increasing externalities and transaction costs.
These considerations are taken up in turn. First, recognizing
private ownership of a public good makes it less likely that the good
will be put to its highest valued uses. The key difference between a
public and private good is that public goods are not subject to
rivalrous consumption. With a private good, making one use, such as
eating an apple, forecloses another, such as making an apple pie.
That is simply not true for public goods. One person can read a book
aloud, another can make a film from it, and yet another can translate
it. With public goods, such as a copyrighted work, all uses are
possible. Imposing a private property regime and requiring licenses
for derivative uses gives the owner the right to say no. Instead of
ensuring that all uses being possible, a private property regime
ensures that only permitted uses are possible. As a result, once an
original work is created, a private property regime can only limit our
ability to put an original work to all of its valuable uses.
Second, recognizing private ownership of a public good
increases externalities. A private property regime requires licenses,
and licenses cost time and money to negotiate. Where these
transaction costs for a given derivative use exceed the gains in trade
associated with the use at issue, the parties will not even bother to
enter into negotiation to license the use. Unable to obtain a license,
the use, which in the absence of a private property regime could occur
freely, will not occur at all. For works of authorship, a private
77. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REV.
347 (1967).
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property regime will thus increase externalities and hinder
expression.
Third, recognizing private ownership of a public good increases,
rather than decreases, transaction costs. Even if the licensing market
works and the original copyright owner licenses all valuable uses and
ensures in the license a remunerative return for the derivative author,
by requiring a license, negotiations are forced for uses that could
otherwise occur without a license. For example, if the courts had
determined that the uses at issue in Micro Star or Rogers v. Koons
were fair and noninfringing, then those uses could occur without a
license. By finding them unfair and hence within the scope of the
copyright owner's exclusive control, the courts effectively required
licenses for such uses. As a result, even assuming that a license could
be obtained, requiring licenses simply imposes a transaction cost-the
time and expense both parties will incur to negotiate a license-that
would not otherwise exist. For works of authorship, a private property
regime thus increases transaction costs. Unless it can clearly be
shown that the additional licensing revenue was necessary to ensure
the creation and publication of an original work in the first place, the
usual justifications for recognizing property rights simply do not apply
and indeed cut against the recognition of such rights.
Moreover, even if there is sbme plausible claim that the
additional licensing revenue will lead to more or better original works,
it is necessary to balance that potential gain against the losses that
imposing a private property regime on a public good will entail. The
question thus becomes: how effectively will a licensing market for
derivative uses work? But there is a catch-22 here. Licensing
markets must work reasonably well, or else the increased transaction
costs, externalities, and refusals to license valuable uses will outweigh
any potential benefit from the additional licensing revenues. Yet, they
must not work perfectly. If they worked perfectly, then the Coase
theorem would come into play,78 and there would be no reason to grant
control over the derivative uses at all. With a perfect market, if the
makers of two complementary products could earn more joint revenue
by reallocating some of the existing revenue stream from one
complementary product to another, then they would negotiate the
reallocation themselves.
78. The Coase Theorem, as it has come to be known, states that, in the absence of
transaction costs and other potential market imperfections, the parties will bargain to ensure an
efficient outcome regardless of the initial assignment of legal rights. R. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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Consider, for example, the iPod. The value of an iPod to
consumers comes not from the iPod alone and not from the music
alone but from the combination of the iPod and music. Consumers
will pay more for this combination if iPods improve. They will also
pay more for the combination if the supply of music available for the
iPod improves. Maximizing the revenue that can be earned from the
iPod plus music thus requires balancing the incentives given to Apple
for improving iPods, the incentives given to songwriters and
performing artists for making more and better music, and the
incentives for making the music available to iPod owners. With
iTunes in place to make music available, the focus turns to the first
two incentives. If the law were to allocate all of the joint revenue to
Apple, it would provide too little incentive for making more and better
music, resulting in an inefficient market. On the other hand, if the
law were to allocate all of the joint revenue to musicians and
songwriters, this too would be inefficient as it would provide too little
incentive for making iPods.
One way to solve this is to try and write copyright law to
ensure the precisely correct allocation of incentives. No matter how
well intentioned, Congress is unlikely to achieve that level of accuracy.
Fortunately, as Professor Coase recognized, the law does not need to
get it precisely right because, whatever allocation the law initially
establishes, the parties are free to renegotiate. If the law's initial
allocation provides too much incentive for improving iPods and too
little for making music, or vice versa, Professor Coase predicts, at
least in the absence of transaction costs and other market
imperfections, that the parties will renegotiate in order to get the
incentives for each complement to a level that maximizes the revenue
available from the combined sales of iPods and their associated music.
Taken to its logical conclusion, Professor Coase's analysis
suggests that there is simply no reason, if markets are perfect, to
provide musical work copyright owners with the legal right to control
the sales of iPods or any other complement. If the failure to grant
such control legally leaves copyright owners with too few incentives,
and leads to an undersupply of original works, then the derivative and
complementary users should renegotiate the allocation of revenue
between them in order to ensure an optimal supply of original works.
Even in the real world, where markets are not perfect, some such
reallocations should occur along various margins, at least where the
potential gains in trade available exceed the expected transaction
costs.
The primary concern, however, is not that the licensing
markets for derivative and complementary uses will work too well, but
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that these licensing markets, particularly with respect to creative
reworkings of an original work, will not work well enough. Three
reasons account for this. First, such licensing markets suffer from
Arrow's information paradox. 79 Arrow's information paradox works as
follows: if I have a great idea for a derivative use of your original
work, how do I go about getting a license, and should the law require
it? You will not agree to let me make my use, or set a price for a
license, until I tell you what the use is, but if I tell you what the use is,
you can simply take my idea and use it yourself. Recall the facts in
the Harry Potter lexicon case. If Steven Vander Ark wants to create a
lexicon, an encyclopedia based upon J.K. Rowling's popular book
series, and a license is required, how does he negotiate for one? If he
goes and asks permission, nothing would stop Rowling, or her
publisher, from saying, "That's a great idea; one that we have been
planning to do for a long time." Even if Rowling and her publisher are
lying, and are simply "stealing" Ark's idea for such a derivative use,
under the district court's vision of copyright law, they would be
perfectly entitled to do so. 80 This licensing paradox would confront,
and potentially confound, not merely Mr. Vander Ark, but also an
other potential creators, such as an individual who planned to write a
summary of the Twin Peaks television show,81 or to create a multiple
choice trivia quiz based upon the Seinfeld program, called the Seinfeld
Aptitude Test (or SAT).8 2
This paradox is not only potentially unfair, in that it leaves the
original copyrighted owner free to take others' creative ideas, but,
more importantly, it is also potentially inefficient, as it will discourage
those who come up with such creative ideas from ever coming forward.
Mr. Vander Ark, the author of the Twin Peak guide, and the creator of
the SAT all pursued their ideas, only to be found to be copyright
infringers. Given their treatment at the hands of copyright law,
people who come up with similarly creative ideas for derivative users
in the future will be less likely to pursue those ideas. As a result,
79. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 614-16 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
. 80. Cf. Lemley, supra note 77, at 1074-76 (suggesting that courts should give the
derivative work creator his own copyright in order to set up blocking copyrights and force the
original copyright owner to negotiate with the derivative work creator in order to exploit the
derivative market, rather than simply "steal" the idea for the derivative work).
81. Twin Peak Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that such a book summarizing the confusing plot of the Twin Peaks television show was an
unfair and infringing use).
82. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that such a multiple choice trivia book constituted an unfair and infringing use).
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society will be worse off. In many cases, society will lose creative
reworkings altogether, as the derivative author will not pursue them
and the original copyright owner will not think of them. Even where
the original copyright owner had the same idea and planned to pursue
it,83 society is usually better off with both versions, rather than just an
authorized version,8 4 even if that competition means less revenue for
the original copyright owner. The only clear exception to this general
rule that should be recognized is where the derivative use at issue is a
natural monopoly. If the derivative use at issue has a natural
monopoly character, such that only one such use will be available,
then society is arguably better off with the authorized version, rather
than with the unauthorized version. This is particularly true if the
derivative use at issue represents a recognized and well-established
market, such as a film version of a novel, where recognizing the
original copyright owner's control over the derivative use is not likely
to foreclose, through Arrow's information paradox, the derivative use
from ever occurring.
The second difficulty with requiring permission for creative
derivative uses is that the original author and the would-be derivative
author often have differing creative visions.8 5 Given the legal right to
do so, if the original author objects to the creative vision embodied in
the derivative use, he will block it. Putting to one side the so-called
moral rights justification for such a right,8 6 the sole relevant question
under U.S. law is whether extending copyright owners the right to
control the meaning of their works, by blocking inconsistent re-
interpretations, would "promote the progress of Science." Copyright
law, as it presently stands, has already answered this question with
83. This is the story, for example, that J.K. Rowling offered on the stand in the Harry
Potter case. See Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 519 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (" owling has stated on a number of occasions since 1998 that, in addition to the two
companion books, she plans to publish a 'Harry Potter encyclopedia' after the completion of the
series and again donate the proceeds to charity."). Yet, a quick check of Amazon.com reveals that
this supposedly planned authorized encyclopedia remains unavailable. This case represents an
example where society would have been better off with the unauthorized bird in hand than the
authorized bird supposedly in the bush.
84. With both versions, consumers are free to choose between, for example, Vander Ark's
lexicon and the authorized lexicon. This gives each author the incentive to make the work better
than the competition, increasing its value for consumers.
85. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252-53 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that a use was
transformative and thus fair when derivative author was attempting to convey sharply different
artistic message).
86. A full discussion of the flaws in any such approach is beyond the scope of this essay,
but the short answer, at least for this author, is that there is no more, and no less, reason why an
author should, on moral grounds, have the right to control re-workings of his original work, once
copies are sold, than a farmer should have the right to control whether her apples, once they are
sold, are made into pie.
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respect to the one use many authors will find most objectionable:
parody. Indeed, courts consistently find parody to be a fair, and hence
non-infringing, use, precisely because the original copyright owner
would object to it and might refuse, if given the option, to permit it.87
This approach to parody seems to contradict any notion that an
original author should have the legal right to control potentially
objectionable re-use of his work simply because of his hurt feelings.
The same reasons that justify broader fair use for parody would
seem to justify broader fair use for a far wider range of derivative uses
than simply parody. Parody creates value by offering a sharply
contrasting interpretation of a given work, but so do a broad range of
reinterpretative uses. A copyright owner is unlikely to license a
parody of their work, but copyright owners are equally unlikely to
license a broad range of derivative uses with an inconsistent,
conflicting, or merely different artistic vision.
The third difficulty with requiring permission for creative
derivative uses is that the interposition of a legal formality-obtaining
permission-may frustrate the creative process. The concern here is
not that the original copyright owner would simply take the idea, or
even that the original copyright owner would likely refuse permission
if asked, but that simply knowing that permission is required, a later
author may decide to pursue some other avenue for her creativity
altogether. The creative process can be delicate-a combination of
passion, spontaneity, and insight. If an author cannot pursue an
insight when it strikes, but must wait for legal permission that, even
assuming it can be obtained, will likely be a long time coming, the
delay may, for many authors, kill the passion and spontaneity
necessary to bring the insight to fruition.88
87. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (reversing Sixth
Circuit's finding of unfair and infringing use where reworking of Pretty Woman could be
perceived as having a parodic character); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:
A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600, 1632-35 (1982); Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67,
71-75 (1992). To establish that a use is fair, a parodist need not show that the reinterpretations
is so objectionable that a copyright owner would have refused permission, however. See Leibovitz
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 n.3 (2d Cir. 1998).
While we agree that the fair use defense can play a valuable role in allowing
commentary with criticizing messages to see the light of day, the fair use doctrine is
broad enough to protect even those commentaries that are not so damaging that the
original author would refuse to license them for a fee.
Id.
88. See Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Ceasar: Taking Incentives Seriously,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 81-87 (2004) (noting, as well, that asking for and receiving permission for a
given re-use may itself "suppress or distort the borrower's creative impulse"). Also, the implicit
assumption in the text is that derivative work authors know and follow the law. A derivative
author may, of course, pursue his or her artistic insight in any event, either from ignorance,
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Sampling and rap music illustrate well the dangers that
interposing a licensing requirement can present for the artistic
process. When rap music first developed, sampling was common.8 9
Courts, however, decided that such sampling was an infringing use
and barred such sampling absent permission from the original
copyright owner.90 In reaching that conclusion, courts pretended that
a licensing market was practicable, and to be fair, a limited licensing
market for such uses has developed. But these rulings fundamentally
changed the nature of rap music. Sampling, once ubiquitous, became
rare. 91 Sitting in a studio, laying down a track, if someone decides
they need to add something, they may nevertheless end up not simply
adding a sampled piece of another song, even if they use the sample
for a radically different purpose, nor are they likely to wait the months
required for a legal permission to use the sampled bit. Instead, the
only choice in almost all cases is to forego using the sample and to add
something else instead. 92 Some may believe that rap music is better
for this change; some may believe it worse. In either case, no one can
deny that the law fundamentally changed its nature. Through
copyright law, a particular avenue of artistic expression was foreclosed
entirely.93 And for what? For supposed licensing revenues that never
in fact materialized.
Rogers v. Koons provides another example. 94 As previously
discussed, Koons was inspired to create a three-dimensional sculpture
misunderstanding, or defiance of copyright law. Even though this is almost certainly true,
presumably, we should design copyright law assuming that it will be obeyed, and not rely on a
failure to follow the law to ensure that it achieves its constitutional objective.
89. See, e.g., Eric Shimanoff, The Odd Couple: Postmodern Culture and Copyright Law,
11 MEDIAL. & POLOY 12, 24-29 (2002).
90. See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 185
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting preliminary injunction in sampling copyright infringement case and
referring the case "to the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York for
consideration of prosecution of these defendants under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319");
see also Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 292 (D.N.J. 1993) (denying defendants'
summary judgment motion on copyright infringement claim based upon sampling).
91. See, e.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 143-44 (2001); Candace G. Hines,
Note, Black Musical Traditions and Copyright Law: Historical Tensions, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L.
463, 489-91 (2005).
92. See Hines, supra note 91, at 490 ("In response, many rappers began to create their
own sounds in order to obviate the vague legal standards created by the courts." (citation
omitted)).
93. Id. at 491 ('The current costs affiliated with the use of digital sampling have
destroyed the creative sampling styles of rap groups such as Public Enemy, who distinguished
themselves as a rap group via their clever use of hundreds of indecipherable samples in their
songs." (citation omitted)).
94. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
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of a postcard of a couple holding puppies. The creator of the original
postcard sued, and the court found infringement.95 In the future, in
cases of this sort, assuming artists know and follow the law, this
decision creates two possibilities: first, an artist such as Koons, struck
by inspiration, will seek and obtain permission, and return to creating
the sculpture months or years later once permission is obtained; or,
second, an artist such as Koons, although struck by inspiration, will
not pursue creation of the sculpture because of the potential licensing
hurdles that he would face. Given the threat that delay poses to the
spontaneity and passion essential to the creative process, the second
possibility is far more likely in many cases. If that is right, then,
simply by requiring permission, society loses on both sides of the coin.
The follow-on creator never pursues his work, and society will not
benefit from the Koons sculpture. The original author will receive
neither licensing revenues directly from Koons's use nor the additional
revenues he might otherwise have received indirectly from Koons's
work to the extent it popularized, and thereby increased demand for,
the original postcard.
This analysis thus suggests that copyright should leave more
room in fair use for derivative uses that are complementary. So long
as the market for the derivative use is competitive, refusing to grant
the original copyright owner control over the use may not reduce the
original copyright owner's revenue very much. And even if some
revenue reduction occurs, there is little reason to believe that that
reduction will lead to a suboptimal level of production or distribution
of original works. Indeed, given that legal control does not extend to
complements when creativity is invested elsewhere in the economy,
there is no prima facie reason to believe that refusing to extend such
control in the copyright sector will lead to too little investment in
original works. Moreover, any slight risk of underproduction that may
arise must be balanced against the risks that the resulting licensing
market will fail. And that risk is very real. Because they are subject
to Arrow's information paradox, often involve conflicts between the
artistic visions of the original and derivative authors, and can
interfere with the sometimes-delicate nature of the artistic process,
licensing markets for derivative uses are unlikely to work very well.
As a result, requiring a license means that there will be far fewer
derivative works. As a general rule, the risks of license failure far
outweigh the risk of underproduction that would arise from leaving
derivative uses that are complementary and that occur in naturally
competitive markets outside of the copyright owner's control. Only in
95. Id. at 312-13.
2010]
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol, 12:4:779
those cases where the derivative use at issue is either not
complementary, such as translations, or where the resulting market is
naturally monopolistic, such as feature film adaptations, are the risks
of underproduction likely to outweigh the risks of market failure.
Therefore, only in these cases should copyright law grant the original
copyright owner exclusive control over derivative uses, and, even then,
only when it is reasonably certain that the licensing market will work
well enough.
Having developed the principles that should guide copyright's
scope with respect to derivative uses, in the next section, the Article
now returns to the three types of potentially complementary uses
identified in Section I to reexamine copyright's treatment of
complementary uses.
III. REEXAMINING COPYRIGHT'S TREATMENT OF COMPLEMENTS
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, copyright already seems to
follow the guidelines suggested above with respect to complementary
hardware and complementary uses. However, copyright needs to
leave considerably more room for derivative reworkings of original
works.
In the hardware area, at least in theory, the Sony safe harbor
exempts a manufacturer from contributory liability for any
infringements that may occur through the use of its product so long as
the product is "capable of substantial noninfringing use."96 In Sony
itself, Sony was selling the Betamax, which consumers used, inter
alia, to record, without authorization, copyrighted television programs
off the air. Two copyright owners, Disney and Universal, sued and
alleged that Sony, as the manufacturer of the Betamax, was liable for
the copyright infringements of Betamax owners.97 The Court rejected
the argument. Although it acknowledged that some uses of the
Betamax may have been copyright infringement, the Court held that
Sony itself was not liable for such infringing uses. 98 Because the
Betamax could also be used for substantial noninfringing uses, such as
authorized recordings and time-shifting, Sony was not liable even if
some infringing uses did occur.99
Implicitly, this standard compares the product's potential use
as a complement and as a source of substitutes. At the same time, it
96. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
97. Id. at 419-20.
98. Id. at 456.
99. Id. at 443-56.
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puts a heavy hand on the scale against contributory infringement
because a hardware manufacturer cannot practicably obtain consent
from every copyright owner to sell its product. Moreover, denying
copyright owners the legal right to control the sale of such
complements does not mean that copyright owners lose revenue, even
compared to an alternative world in which one more Justice had sided
with Justice Blackmun's dissent and copyright owners could have
demanded a licensing fee or levy on VCR/Betamax sales. 100 The
simple truth is that, although Disney and Universal lost the Sony
case, the creation of the home videotaping market represented a
revenue windfall for audiovisual copyright owners, even without a
formal legal right to control the sales of home videotaping equipment.
Such equipment was available in a reasonably competitive market.
As a result, all of the rents available from the joint value that the
VCR/Betamax and audiovisual works created together went to the
copyright owners anyway.
With respect to complementary uses, such as public
performances, it is important to remember that, when Congress first
added the public performance right to the copyright statute in 1870,101
public performances were not complementary to record sales. At the
time, there were no record sales. Rather, the unauthorized
performance of a musical work at one location competed directly with
authorized performances of the work at a different location. With the
birth of both radio and records in the twentieth century, at least some
public performances became complements. Yet, given the natural
monopoly character of radio broadcasting, it is plausible to justify
extending copyright's public performance right to radio broadcasts.
However, many small bars, stores, and restaurants that play music in
a place open to the public have little, if any, monopoly power. Public
performances in such locations are likely strongly complementary, and
they occur in a competitive market. Thus, the § 110(5) exemption is
not an unprincipled, ad hoc response to lobbying by this interest
group, or at least not solely that. Rather, it is, at least arguably,
consistent with the principles derived from analyzing the economics of
complements.
100. Id. at 457-500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that Sony should have been liable
for copyright infringement as a result of the individual owners use of their Betamaxes to create
unauthorized copies of copyrighted television programs).
101. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 101, 16 Stat. 198, 214 ("And be it further enacted, That
any person publicly performing or representing any dramatic composition for which a copyright
has been obtained, without the consent of the proprietor thereof,... shall be liable for damages
therefor .. " (emphasis in original)).
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When one considers the question of whether webcasting or
interactive Internet musical services should or should not constitute a
public performance, the same approach should control. First, are
these services complements or substitutes for record sales? Second, do
these services have a natural monopoly character like radio
broadcasting? The second question is easier to answer than the first,
given that webcasting does not share the spectrum limitations and
extremely high fixed, low marginal cost character of radio
broadcasting. The first question is more difficult, however. A long
history has demonstrated the positive relationship between radio
airplay and record sales.10 2  Although some evidence suggests a
similar relationship between Internet music and record sales, there is
not a comparable historical track record. 103 Moreover, particularly
where the Internet service at issue plays a particular work in response
the listener's specific requests, and is thus "interactive,"' 104 it becomes
more plausible that the service substitutes for, rather than
complements, record purchases. While political considerations
undoubtedly played a central role in shaping the Copyright Act's
public performance provisions, again, the provisions plausibly coincide
with the principles derived from our analysis of the economics of
complements.
102. Digital Performance Rights: Testimony of the National Association of Broadcasters
on H.R. 1506 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Edward 0. Fritts, President & CEO, National
Association of Broadcasters), available at 1995 WL 371107.
103. For evidence that Internet radio may also boost record sales, see ARBITRON/EDISON
MEDIA RESEARCH, INTERNET 9: THE MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT WORLD OF ONLINE CONSUMERS
(2002), available at http://www.arbitron.com/downloadsI9summary.pdf; see also Allison Kidd,
Recent Development, Mending the Tear in the Internet Radio Community: A Call for a
Legislative Band-Aid, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 339, 365-66 (2003).
104. In Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009), the
Second Circuit considered the question of whether a music service that tailored a music stream
to each of its consumers based upon their individually expressed preferences constituted an
interactive transmission. The plaintiffs argued that it did because the user's preferences
influenced the music the user heard. Id. at 151. The court, however, rejected that argument and
emphasized that the line between an interactive and noninteractive service must reflect
Congress's concern that an interactive service would allow a user to pick the songs she wanted to
hear and thus vitiate any need to purchase those songs. Id. at 157, 161. Finding that the
defendant's Launchcast did not provide that level of interactivity, the Second Circuit held as a
matter of law that Launchcast was not interactive. Id. at 162.
Based on a review of how LAUNCHcast functions, it is clear that LAUNCHcast does
not provide a specially created program within the meaning of § 1146)(7) because the
webcasting service does not provide sufficient control to users such that playlists are
so predictable that users will choose to listen to the webcast in lieu of purchasing
music, thereby-in the aggregate-diminishing record sales.
Id. (citation omitted).
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While copyright's treatment of the first two categories of
complements seems at least consistent with economic principles,
copyright's treatment of derivative reworkings is less consistent. With
respect to whether a derivative author should receive a copyright of
her own, the key and potentially competing concerns from an economic
perspective are ensuring sufficient incentive to create the derivative
work without creating undue monopoly in the derivative work market.
To the extent that derivative works require the same sort of incentive
structure as original works, we should apply a similar originality
standard for granting protection at the front end, while the need to
avoid monopoly suggests the need for a narrow copyright on the back
end. Despite its misstep in Gracen, the Seventh Circuit later
recognized precisely this mix of concerns in Schrock v. Learning Curve
Int'l, Inc.105 In Schrock, Learning Curve had hired Schrock to take
publicity and merchandising photographs of its copyrighted Thomas
the Tank Engine toy trains. 10 6  When their relationship ended,
Learning Curve continued to use Schrock's photographs and Schrock
sued for copyright infringement. 10 7  The district court, following
Gracen, held that Schrock did not hold a valid copyright in his
photographs. 08  The Seventh Circuit reversed. 0 9  Schrock's
photographs, as a matter of law, satisfied copyright's originality
standard. 10 At the same time, however, the court emphasized that
Schrock's was thin."' Thus, if the Learning Curve felt that Schrock
had somehow captured the true essence of Thomas the Tank Engine,
it could negotiate a suitable license. If not, it could simply hire
another photographer to take a new set of photographs. By granting
only a thin copyright, the Schrock court strikes a sensible balance
between the incentive interests of Schrock, the derivative author, and
the need to leave room in the derivative market at issue.
In contrast, the economics of complements suggest that
copyright is far too restrictive with respect to derivative reworkings
that are complementary. As Rogers v. Koons well illustrates, any
possibility that allowing a derivative use would decrease the copyright
105. 586 F.3d 513, 521 (71h Cir. 2009) (holding that the originality standard for derivative
works is not demanding than for other works, while noting that "the copyright in a derivative
work is thin, extending only to the incremental original expression contributed by the author of
the derivative work").
106. Id. at 515.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 516.
110. Id. at 522.
111. Id. ("Accordingly, the photos qualify for the limited derivative-work copyright
provided by § 103(b).").
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owner's revenue from licensing a similar use, even if the copyright
owner had and has no plans to enter the market, will suffice for some
courts to enjoin the use at issue. 112 The knee-jerk imposition of a
regime of private rights is, however, inherently inappropriate for a
public good such as a work of authorship. While copyright should
grant an original copyright owner control over some types of
derivative reworkings, it should generally limit that control to
reworkings that are either not complementary, such as translations,
or have a natural monopoly character, such as film adaptations.
Moreover, given the constraints inherent in creating a faithful film
adaptation or translation, there is less risk of licensing failure for
these specific types of reworkings than for those reworkings that
change the message or meaning of the underlying work.
Aside from these special cases where exclusive control is
plausibly justified, a derivative reworking that is complementary and
that does not exhibit such high fixed costs as to lead naturally to
monopoly should generally be beyond the original copyright's owner
control. Even if the reworking copies original and expressive material,
as long as the use is complementary and occurs in a competitive
market, the original copyright owner is appropriately compensated for
the use by increased sales and revenues from her own work. Allowing
her to control such derivative reworkings might increase her revenue,
given the resulting ability to extract a licensing fee, but such
additional revenue comes at too high a price for society. Any tendency
that this additional revenue may have to ensure that original works of
authorship are not underproduced, relative to the social ideal, is
simply outweighed by the cultural and economic loss from the
innumerable reworkings that a licensing requirement would
effectively foreclose.
IV. COPYRIGHT, COMPLEMENTS, AND DERIVATIVE WORKS
Without falling back on the notion that Congress has foreclosed
consideration of the complement-substitute distinction or on false
analogies to private goods, two fundamental questions thus arise.
First, is the substitute-complement distinction ever material to a
determination of copyright infringement? And second, if it is material,
are there nevertheless some uses that, although complementary in the
112. 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Sara K. Stadler, Invention, Creation, &
Public Policy Symposium: The Copyright Act & The Public Interest: Relevant Markets for
Copyrighted Works, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1059, 1068 (2009) ("What if the plaintiff has no plans to
occupy the derivative market at issue? No matter. Courts grant copyright owners the right to
exploit derivative markets even if they never have shown any interest in doing so.").
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economic sense, should nonetheless constitute infringement? If the
answer to both of these questions is yes, then a third question arises:
how should copyright law distinguish those complementary uses that
are fair from those that are infringing?
Measured against copyright's purposes, this Article posits that
the answer to the first two questions is indeed yes. With respect to
the third, copyright should presumptively leave most complementary
uses beyond the copyright owner's right to control. They should
constitute an unfair and hence infringing use only if, on balance, a
right of control would lead to more or better original works to such an
extent that the additional output would outweigh the inevitable costs
and reduced production of derivative works that imposing a private
property regime on a public good would create. In undertaking this
balance, the extent of the additional revenue that a licensing
requirement will generate will depend, ceteris paribus, on the extent
to which (1) the use at issue is complementary, and (2) the associated
market is naturally competitive or monopolistic.
These factors suggest, on the one hand, that a complementary
use, such as the dramatization of a novel, should be within the
copyright owner's exclusive control. The market for a movie version of
a novel has had, at least historically, a natural monopoly character.
Specifically, because of the high cost of creating a professional-quality
movie from a novel, society is likely to get only one movie version of
any given novel at a given time. As a result, allowing unauthorized
movies will not only reduce the revenue from an authorized version
but will also often foreclose the creation of the authorized version
altogether. And, while some efforts to turn novels into movies fall
through as a result of creative differences between the author and the
director/producer, the licensing market seems to work reasonably well
in this area. A similar argument can be made for extending a
copyright owner the right to translate her works, though here the key
issue is that a translation is not much of a complement at all, but
simply a separate market.
Still, translation and film adaptation should not be taken as
the norm and used to justify, by analogy, extending the copyright
owner's control over derivative reworkings generally. As long as the
derivative reworking at issue is complementary, in that it increases
demand for the underlying original, and occurs in a naturally
competitive market, extending such control would frustrate, rather
than serve, copyright's ultimate purpose. Requiring licenses for
derivative reworkings, such as Koons' statue, would not lead to more
revenue for the original copyright owner. It would lead to less. Most
likely, were a license required, the derivative reworking would simply
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not occur. The original copyright owner would not, therefore, receive
any licensing revenue from such uses. Furthermore, the copyright
owner would also lose the increased revenue from her original that
derivative reworking, as a complement, would, by definition, create.
As a result, the "progress of Science" would be better served by placing
derivative reworkings that are both complementary and that occur in
competitive markets beyond the original copyright owner's control.
Such uses should be presumptively fair and non-infringing.
